Bryn Mawr College

Scholarship, Research, and Creative Work at Bryn Mawr
College
Political Science Faculty Research and Scholarship

Political Science

1980

"Cool Reflexion" and the Criticism of Values: Is,
Ought, and Objectivity in Hume's Social Science
Stephen G. Salkever
Bryn Mawr College, ssalkeve@brynmawr.edu

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.brynmawr.edu/polisci_pubs
Part of the Political Science Commons
Custom Citation
Salkever, Stephen G. "'Cool Reflexion' and the Criticism of Values: Is, Ought, and Objectivity in Hume's Social Science." American
Political Science Review 74 (1980): 70-77.

This paper is posted at Scholarship, Research, and Creative Work at Bryn Mawr College. http://repository.brynmawr.edu/polisci_pubs/17
For more information, please contact repository@brynmawr.edu.

"CoolReflexion"andthe Criticismof Values:
Is, Ought,andObjectivityin Hume'sSocialScience
STEPHENG. SALKEVER
BrynMawrCollege
Is the fact/valuedistinction incompatiblewith the possibility of a social science which is both
objectiveand evaluative(or normative)?Does support of the latterrequirerejectionof the former
and vice versa? This article presents an indirect argumentagainst the incompatibilityof the
fact/value distinction and an objectively evaluativesocial science. My procedureis to show that
David Hume, whose is/ought distinction is the locus classicusof the fact/value distinction, is
committed both to the view that valuescannot be derivedfrom facts and to the view that social
science is not (and should not be) value-neutral.Furthermore,Hume'sposition is free from any
logical flaws. My conclusion is that it is false to say that the fact/value distinction entails a
value-neutralsocial science, and that it is thereforeutterlyunnecessaryfor criticsof such a science
to wastetheir time attemptingto "bridgethe gap" betweenfacts and values.
Perhaps the most powerful, and surely the
most famous, argument for the exclusion of
moral predicates from social scientific discussion is contained in David Hume's is/ought
distinction, which occurs in A Treatise of
Human Nature (pp. 469-70).
In this muchdisputed passage, Hume appears to claim that
ought propositions cannot be deduced from is
propositions, and that it is therefore a logical
error to claim that moral distinctions or judgments can be derived from reason. The question
is this: does Hume's "celebrated observation"
(Hare, 1964, p. 29) that ought cannot be
deduced from is require the conclusion that
ought propositions are not subject to criticism
and revision on rational grounds (in the way
that descriptive or explanatory propositions
may be criticized) and so must be excluded
from any objective and rigorous social science?
My argument will be that Hume does not draw
this conclusion, and that his rejection of valueneutrality as a goal of social science is not
inconsistent with his rejection on logical
grounds of the deduction of ought from is, of
value from fact.
One further preliminary distinction is required here: in speaking of Hume's implicit
criticism of value-neutrality I am not claiming,
for Hume or in general, that objectivity is
enhanced insofar as the social scientist holds
certain values at the outset of his or her inquiry
(Miller, 1979). Rather, my contention is that
the conclusion of such inquiry will be the
evaluation or criticism of values, rather than the
description or explanation of moral and cultural judgments in value-neutral terms (see
Gibson, 1977).
The is/ought passage itself has been, in the
last 20 years, the object of as much close
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analysis as the most obscure classical text.1
Although on first inspection "Hume's "Guillotine" seems to bring about a clean separation
between facts and values, a closer look reveals
ambiguities. The interpretive difficulties arise
when Hume says that it "seems altogether
inconceivable, how this new relation [the ought
proposition] can be a deduction from others [is
propositions] which are entirely different from
it" (Black, 1969, p. 100, emphasis added).
When Hume says that such a deduction "seems
altogether inconceivable," is he ironically expressing the view that it really is inconceivable,
or only stating a difficult problem to be solved
by the rest of book 3 of the Treatise? And
when he says "deduction," does he mean strict
logical entailment (in which case some other
form of inference from fact to value might be
possible) or any inference whatsoever (in which
case the gap between fact and value would be
absolutely unbridgeable)? Furthermore, how
radical is the break with earlier moral and
political philosophy proposed by the is/ought
distinction? In the same paragraph, Hume says
that he is both exposing a defect in "every
system of morality" and that his distinction
"wou'd subvert all the vulgar systems of morality"; that these expressions are not synonymous
is suggested by Hume's frequent separation of
learned and vulgar judgments.2

1The first important demonstration of the difficulties that emerge from a careful reading of the passage
was that of McIntyre (1969), to whom my own
discussion of Hume owes a great deal.
20ne possible resolution of this difficulty would be
to suggest that Hume was opposed to all "systems" in
science, on the grounds that they distorted our view of
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The meaning of the is/ought passage is of
more than simply exegetical concern insofar as
it squarely raises the issue of whether Hume's
distinction can be used as a warrant for
claiming that values or moral propositions
(unlike factual beliefs) are not subject to
rational defense or criticism. If so, then such
propositions should be excluded from that
"science of man" (Treatise, p. xxii) whose
foundation on an objective basis forms the goal
of the Treatise as a whole. Since the disputed
passage is not self-explanatory, any attempt to
deal with this question must look beyond it to
Hume's own practice of social science in book
3.
Hume's Practice of Social Science
Many of Hume's most famous logical and
psychological doctrines and aphorisms suggest
the conclusion that moral judgments are not
susceptible of rational evaluation. Moral judgments are constituted by a feeling or sentiment,
and are not conclusions of reason (Treatise, pp.
471, 457). Reasoning is always subsequent to a
determination of the passions, and so can never
judge them: "Reason is, and ought only to be
the slave of the passions" (Treatise, p. 415).
Actions, which are to be construed as reflections of moral principles, can be called laudable
or blameworthy, "but they cannot be reasonable or unreasonable" (Treatise, pp. 477, 458).
Passionate preferences appear to be similarly
closed to rational critique: " 'Tis not contrary
to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole
world to the scratching of my finger" (Treatise,
p. 416). All this suggests that it would be
plausible to attribute to Humne a sort of
pre-Stevensonian emotivism,3 and to conclude
that while social science may indeed explain
and classify moral judgments it should avoid
the inappropriate evaluation of such judgments

the evidence (An Inquiry Conceming the Principles of
Morals, p. 8), a view which was almost a commonplace
in eighteenth-century discussions of science. (For a
discussion of a similarly critical response to "system"
in Rousseau and Buffon, see Salkever, 1978, pp.
216-17.) However, since Hume does refer to his own
work as a "system of .ethics" (Treatise, p. 618), this
resolution does not agree precisely with every instance
of Hume's use of the term.
3This is proposed by Flew (1969, p. 67). Ardal
(1966, p. 212) argues that while Hume is not strictly
speaking an emotivist (since he was not specifically
concerned with the nature of moral utterance), emotivism is "in conformity with other aspects of his
philosophy."
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in terms of their rationality.
Nevertheless, the bulk of Hume's social
science in book 3 of the Treatise is as much
concerned with justification and evaluation as it
is with the explanation of moral phenomena.
Hume does of course spend a good deal of time
explaining how human beings come to have
those peculiar sensations which we call praise
and blame; this explanation revolves around his
account of the process of communicated affections which he calls sympathy (Treatise, p.
576). But he also wants to answer the substantive moral question of what virtue (and particularly, justice) is, as well as the psychological
question of how we come to call certain
phenomena (or characters) virtuous or vicious.
Justice, according to Hume, is defined by
the three fundamental laws of stability of
possession, translation by consent, and the
performance of promises (Treatise, p. 541). His
argument that this conception of justice can be
justified by reference to a particular conception
of the facts which constitute the human condition and general human interest is too well
known to require extensive summary here (see
McIntyre, 1969, pp. 39-42). The basic fact or
major premise of the argument is that human
beings, unlike any other animals, are creatures
of numberless needs and slender resources, and
that it is by the conventions of social organization alone that man is "able to supply his
defects" (Treatise, pp. 484-85). The gravest of
these defects is the instability and uncertainty
"of such possessions as we have acquir'd by our
industry or good fortune," and it is this
particular defect (rather than, say, our capacity
for vice, as for Aristotle) which provides the
problem to which the conventions of society
and justice are the solution (Treatise, pp. 487,
491).
Thus far we are dealing only with Hume's
conception of the facts, and with the process of
reasoning or drawing inferences from one set of
facts to another: from the defining characteristics of the human condition to those conventions and rules which are best suited to solving
the problems implicit in these characteristics.
This inference is sufficient to defend Hume's
conception of justice as a more reasonable
solution to the human problem than its competitors, such as the Aristotelian notion of
justice as fitness in distribution (Treatise, p.
502), but it is not sufficient to attach a sense of
moral obligation or a sentiment of duty to the
rules of Humean justice. One may, without
self-contradiction, accept the argument and still
not feel any obligation to abstain from the
property of others or to keep one's promises:
"We have no motive leading us to the perfor-
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mance of promises distinct from a sense of
duty" (Treatise, p. 518).4 If Iremain unmoved
by the prospect of enhancing the general
interest of mankind, no amount of careful
inductive inference can cause me to feel a duty
to enhance that interest. However, once the
connection between interest and justice is
established, Hume does believe that the natural
operations of sympathy, combined with parental instruction and political education, will in
most cases add a sense of moral obligation to
those rules for which political philosophy and
social science (which are one and the same for
Hume) provide the justification (Treatise, pp.
533-34).5
But these are two separate processes: social science can show the causal link
between a particular conception of justice and
human interest, but this demonstration cannot
by itself compel moral (or action-guiding)
assent to its conclusions. I may well agree that
promise-keeping is in the interest of mankind
and yet feel no moral obligation to keep
promises to people I dislike without in any way
contradicting myself. My deficiency is in
sympathy, not reason. Justice is a means to an
end, and will be valued or desired only insofar
as the end is valued (Treatise, p. 619).
Thus for Hume social science is limited in
that it cannot compel moral assent, a limitation
which can be established on both logical and
psychological grounds. But it is not at all
irrelevant to morality, or limited to describing
the development of moral sentiments, since its
conclusions provide either criticism or justification of those principles or values to which a
sense of moral obligation may or may not
become attached. It does this by showing that
the rules of justice and society are not arbitrary
conventions, unlike the rules of various games
(Treatise, p. 484; An Inquiry Concerning the
Principles of Morals, p. 39). Rather, they can be
construed and evaluated as proposed solutions
or answers to the problems posed by the
observable and contingent facts about human
needs, interests, and capacities. A good illustra-

4Thus from a Humean point of view, any attempt
to argue (as does Searle, 1969) that certain institutional facts, like promising, entail obligation, is not only
doomed to failure but utterly beside the point.
5Hume's position here clearly resembles Aristotle's
argument, in the Nicomachean Ethics, that a good
moral character cannot be produced by reason alone,
but can only emerge from a process of habituation. In
general, my reading of Hume suggests that his account
of the form of practical reasoning (though certainly
not of its content) is much closer to Aristotle's than
most (including Hume) have thought.
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tion of this procedure is Hume's discussion of
various competing principles of political obligation, a problem which is central to all his moral
and political writing, in which he criticizes as
mistaken the two extreme views of Tory passive
obedience and Whig contractarianism and attempts to justify a more reasonable middle
ground.6 His argument is that any acceptable
principle of political obligation, the sort of
principle which proposes an idea of the extent
to which a citizen owes allegiance to government, must maximize the satisfaction of the
general interest in peace and liberty and that, in
fact, "the obligation to obedience must cease,
whenever
the interest ceases. . . ," since
"these notions of right and obligation are
deriv'd from nothing but the advantage we reap
from government. . ." (Treatise, pp. 562, 553,
555, emphasis in original).
The function of social science is thus not
simply to describe and explain the views people
actually hold concerning the limits of political
obligation and the nature of justice, but also to
discriminate between adequate and mistaken
conceptions relative to the standard provided
by the facts about the human condition. Such a
science is thus legitimately evaluative as well as
explanatory, although it cannot by itself entail
a sense of obligation, or somehow demonstrate
to those without concern for general human
welfare that they ought to have such a concern.
Moral Judgments and Reasons:
Hume's Distinctions
Thus far I have argued that Hume's practice
of social science rests on the methodological
principle that moral and political judgments are
criticizable on objective grounds, even though
these judgments cannot be derived from, nor be
entailed or required by, any facual propositions. Moral sentiments themselves are neither
rational nor irrational, but the principles to
which they become attached (say, distributive
justice or the contract theory of obligation)
may indeed be criticized in terms of their
rationality as solutions to the problem of
human interest or happiness. Assuming this to
be a fair statement of Hume's position, the
following question remains: does Hume's practice of a critical and evaluative social science
contradict the separation of is and ought
asserted in the first two sections of book 3 of

6Forbes (1975, pp. 193-223) argues persuasively
that moderation was the ruling passion of Hume's
philosophical criticism of British politics.
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the Treatise? While recognizing the dangers
inherent in what Anthony Flew calls the
Infallibility Assumption,7 I will attempt to
show that Hume's argument that moral distinctions are not derived from reason is consistent
in general, though not always in detail, with his
implicit assumption that such distinctions are
criticizable and corrigible on rational and objective grounds.
Hume offers two major arguments for the
conclusion that moral judgments are independent of reason. First, morality results in action
while reason does not; second, the terms
"'reasonable" and "unreasonable" cannot be
applied to actions or morals, but only to
beliefs.8 The first argument seems to rest on a
descriptive psychological claim, the assertion
that as a matter of fact "morals excite passions;
... reason of itself is utterly impotent in this
particular" (Treatise, p. 457). Hume concludes
from this that "the rules of morality . . . are not
conclusions of our reason." There is nothing in
this argument, however, to deny the view that
moral rules, however they are arrived at in the
first instance, may be subject to correction and
revision in the light of subsequent reflection
and experience. It simply says that reason by
itself cannot constitute moral rules. This point
is very similar to Aristotle's claim in book 6 of
in
the Nicomachean Ethics (1 139a35-b4),
which it is argued that since "thought by itself
moves nothing," a person cannot become virtuous simply by engaging in a certain course of
reasoning.9 Reason may be both perfectly
incapable of spontaneously generating morals
and yet perfectly able to evaluate morals.
Hume's second argument for the categorical
separation of reason and morality is much more
ambiguous. His basic premise here appears to be
the logical or analytic claim that reason is
concerned only with the agreement (or disagreement) of a belief to either "real relations

7This is the fallacy of "insisting that where two
passages in an author appear to be inconsistent, one of
these passages has to be so interpreted that the
apparent inconsistency is resolved" (Flew, 1969, p.
65). Of course, one must also be careful to avoid the
practice of Hubristic Restraint, which makes one's
own good sense the measure of an author's consistency.
8What follows is greatly indebted to the presentation of Harrison (1976). Both arguments are deof the
veloped in concise form on pp. 457-58
Treatise.
9This similarity is noted and exploited to a very
different end (that of showing that Aristotle is really a
Humean subjectivist malgre lui) by Irwin (1975).
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of ideas, or to real existence and matter of
fact" (Treatise, p. 458, emphasis in original).
The next step in the argument, however, is the
psychological claim that "passions, volitions,
and actions," which are the components and
the objects of moral judgments, are "original
facts and realities, compleat in themselves," and
thus "not susceptible of any such agreement or
disagreement" (Treatise, p. 458). The inference
drawn from these premises is that virtue is
neither discovered nor derived by the understanding or by reason (Treatise, p. 463). Does
this conclusion mean that moral judgments are
absolutely incorrigible and independent of reason, as is our preference for one flavor of ice
cream rather than another?
Everything here seems to depend on understanding what Hume means by saying that our
passions and actions are "original facts and
realities, compleat in themselves." It is clear
that he does not mean that such phenomena are
self-generating: our feelings or impressions of
moral good and evil arise as a result of the
interaction between the internal actions of our
mind and external objects (Treatise, pp
When this interaction results in a
464-65).
feeling of pleasure or pain of a particular sort
("without reference to our particular interest"
[Treatise, p. 472] ), we Call the feeling one of
virtue or vice. So while it is clearly wrong to say
that virtue can be derived from consideration of
external objects and their relations only, it is
equally misleading to say that virtue is a feeling
spontaneously and independently produced by
the passions alone.
My pleasure in viewing a charitable or a
courageous character derives from the complex
interaction of my impressions of that character
and its effects on others and the sympathetic
pleasure which these impressions produce in
me. The difficulty that Hume encounters in
describing this interaction appears when at the
end of section 1 of book 3, just prior to the
is/ought passage, he attempts to clarify his
conception of our feelings of virtue and vice by
saying that they are like secondary qualities in
modem (Lockean) philosophy and physics,
perceptions in the mind rather than qualities in
objects (Treatise, p. 469). The problem with
this analogy is that Hume has already, in book
1 (Treatise, pp. 226-31), presented very strong
arguments against the intelligibility of the
distinction between primary and secondary
qualities. This inconsistency suggests a very
serious difficulty in Hume's account of the
nature of our moral judgments. Is there any
Humean way around it?
I believe that there is; it lies in noting that
moral judgments are not, for Hume, the only
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judgments which are internal, not derived from
reason, and yet corrigible and subject to criticism by experience and reflection. These characteristics also apply to our judgments of
efficient causal necessity, whose critique forms
the subject of book 1 of the Treatise. 10 This
analogy has been traced in detail by Lewis
White Beck (1974), who argues that the gap
between is and ought is, for Hume, the same as
the gap between was and must be. Hume's
critique of causality consists of showing that all
causal judgments arise from two interacting
elements: our probabilistic reasoning concerning the connections among events (Treatise, pp.
180-8 1), and the supervenient belief that
future events will (or "must be") connected in
the same way that similar events have been in
our past experience. Much of book 1 is devoted
to an account of the conditions under which we
come to experience causal judgments (showing
that they are derived from custom and habit,
rather than reason), just as much of book 3 is
devoted to an account of the conditions under
which we experience moral judgments 1 (showing that they are derived from sympathy, rather
than reason). A good way of summarizing the
similarities between causal and moral judgments
is to note that, for Hume, both can be
understood on the model of aesthetic appreciation, as matters of taste (Treatise, pp. 103, 462,
547n., 577, 581-82);Morals, p. 6).
But to say that they are matters of taste is
not at all to say that they are strictly subjective
and incorrigible; there is a real (not only a
conventional) difference between good and bad
taste (Treatise, p. 472), and similarly a difference between good and bad causal judgments, or between good and bad science. Book
1 of the Treatise is by no means a blanket
indictment of all inductive causal inference as
unreasonable. It also contains a lengthy analysis
of the ways in which we can correct errors in
10Compare the language of the is/ought passage
with the following statement on p. 134 of the
Treatise: ". . . let men be once fully convinced of
these two principles [that 'cause' is not in any object,
and that there is no reason for inferring causality from
constant conjunction, and this will throw them so
loose from all common systems, that they will make
no difficulty of receiving any, which may appear the
most extraordinary."
III think, however, that it is misleading to say,
with Ardal (1966, p. 195), that this is Hume's "chief
objective" in book 3. Harrison's conclusion that Hume
was asking a moral question, rather than a psychological or sociological one (at least, given twentiethcentury definitions of these sciences), seems nearer the
mark (1976, pp. 122-23).
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those probabilistic judgments to which causal
beliefs become attached, providing a set of
general rules of inductive method (Treatise, pp.
173-75) by which we can "learn to distinguish
the accidental circumstances from the efficacious causes," and so avoid erroneous judgments like those expressed in the prejudices
that "an Irishman cannot have wit, and a
Frenchman cannot have solidity" (Treatise, pp.
149, 146, emphasis in original).12 Although
causal judgments are not themselves derived
from or by reasoning, accurate and careful
reasoning concerning those probabilistic inferences on which causal beliefs depend can
improve the quality of those beliefs and enable
us to reject mistaken causal systems and claims.
Moral judgments guide conduct and are not
derived from abstract reason; moral obligations
are not entailed by "the discovery of certain
connexions and relations of ideas, which are
eternal, immutable, and universally obligatory"
p. 496). But all moral judgments
(Treatise,
(whether "artificial" or "natural") contain or
are supervenient on causal probabilistic claims
that certain dispositions or characters tend to
promote the interests of society or mankind,
just as causal scientific claims are supervenient
on probabilistic judgments that some events
regularly precede other events (Treatise, p. 579;
Beck, 1974, p. 221). Thus it makes perfect
Humean sense to say that there can be "fatal
errors in our conduct" and in the desires and
moral judgments which produce that conduct
(Treatise, p. 538). Furthermore, while reason
alone has no power to direct our action,
"reason -and judgment may, indeed, be the
mediate cause of an action, by prompting, or
by directing a passion" (Treatise, p. 462).
This position is expressed with even greater
clarity in the first section of the second
Inquiry, where Hume says that even though
reason cannot be the proximate cause of any
action, and thus cannot take the place of moral
sentiments, "in order to pave the way for such
a sentiment and give a proper discernment of its
object, it is often necessary, we find, that much
reasoning should precede, that nice distinctions
be made, just conclusions drawn, distant comparisons formed, complicated relations examined, and general facts fixed and ascertained" (Morals, p. 6).1 3 To say that reason is a

12 I am guided here by Cassidy (1977).
13See also Morals, p. 105: "Reason, when fully
assisted and improved, is sufficient to instruct us in
the pernicious or useful tendency of qualities and
actions, but it is not alone sufficient to produce any
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mediate cause of conduct is surely to say much
more than that reason is simply instrumental,
nothing more than a calculation of the best
means to an end independently and irrationally
established by passion. Reasoning can ascertain
general facts concerning human need or interest, and draw inferences concerning the
dispositions and customs which tend to promote this interest. Hume's social science is itself
a critique of those practical reasonings which
are implicit in various customs and moral
systems, and not simply an account of the
conditions under which such systems arise.
There are two general classes of errors which
can result in unsatisfactory moral judgments:
errors concerning the basic human needs
(which, according to Hume, are the needs for
peace and liberty in general, and the stability of
possessions in particular), and errors concerning
the rules and dispositions which best satisfy
those needs. The two great sources of both
types of error are a priori moral systems which
distort our view of the observable facts concerning human needs (Morals, p. 8) and our
natural tendency to mistake judgments about
our own interests for genuine moral judgments:
"There is no quality in human nature, which
causes more fatal errors in our conduct, than
that which leads us to prefer whatever is
present to the distant and remote, and makes us
desire objects more according to their situation
than their intrinsic value" (Treatise, p. 538).
These sources of error are precisely analogous to the two sources of mistakes concerning
inductive inferences. The first error can be
corrected by insisting on the importance of fact
and observation in practical reasoning, as in
science. The second involves the question of the
proper perspective from which moral judgments
can be made, and is the same as the problem
relative to "our judgments concerning external
bodies" in natural science (Treatise, p. 603).
Our moral judgments will be free from implicit
errors to the extent that they are informed by a
process of reflection which enables us to
consider the value of characters and disposi-

moral blame or approbation." There are important
doubts about the propriety of using the Inquiries to
solve interpretive difficulties in the Treatise (see Ardal,
1966, pp. 2-3), since in many respects the Inquiries
are intended by Hume to smooth over perplexities
that are squarely faced in the Treatise. The elimination
of the doctrine of sympathy from the second Inquiry
is but one instance of this. I have tried to deal with
these problems by citing the Inquiries only when there
is, to my mind, clear agreement between them and the
Treatise.
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tions from the perspective of the interests of
mankind. A necessary condition for adequate
reflection of this kind is the intercourse of
sentiments in society, which is made possible
by sympathy, and which enables us to say that
"X is good" instead of "X pleases me" (Treatise, pp. 574-91; Beck, 1974, p. 226). Genuine
moral judgments are not produced independently or spontaneously by asocial individuals,
but emerge only in the process of expressing
and comparing views about how best to solve
common human problems, and to satisfy shared
human needs (Morals, pp. 94-9 5). This is the
function of language and reason, and is not
merely instrumental or subsequent to moral
judgment, but is in an important sense at least
partially constitutive of such judgments.
But sociality is not a sufficient condition for
the production of praiseworthy moral sentiments. Hume does not claim that all misplaced
moral judgments can be attributed to inadequate socialization. He would not, I think,
reject the Aristotelian observation that it is
possible to be both a good citizen and a not so
good human being, and he is surely neither a
conventionalist nor a cultural relativist.14 The
most striking evidence for this is his consistent
criticism of the praise generally given to heroism, military glory, and courage in general:
"Heroism, or military glory, is much admir'd by
the generality of mankind. They consider it as
the most sublime kind of merit. Men of cool
reflexion are not so sanguine in their praises of
it. The infinite confusions and disorder, which
it has caus'd in the world, diminish much of its
merit in their eyes" (Treatise, pp. 600-01).
Similarly, those societies and cultures which
seem to equate courage and virtue, like the
Roman Republic and Homeric Greece (Morals,
pp. 79-80), are subject to criticism on the
grounds that their judgments of value are
informed by a mistaken conception of real
human needs and interests. At something like
the other extreme, the "monkish virtues," such
celibacy, self-denial, humility, and solitude,
are contrary to reason and will everywhere be
rejected by "men of sense" (Morals, p. 91). The

14Nor is he guilty of the ethnocentrist view that all
societies are fundamentally like England and France,
in spite of some well-known passages such as the
following from section 8 of the first Inquiry (Understanding, p. 93): "Mankind are so much the same, in
all times and places, that history informs us of nothing
new or strange in this particular." See also Morals, p.
33. The position that Hume was very sensitive to
cultural differences as well as uniformities has been
effectively set forth by Forbes (1975, pp. 102-21).
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language of a culture is a necessary condition
for the emergence of impartial moral judgments, but that language may reflect mistaken
perceptions of human needs and the qualities
which serve them and so issue in defective
moral judgments or cultural values.
Nor does Hume hold that moral controversies can be resolved by determining what moral
views are held by most humans most of the
time. Thus I think Harrison is mistaken in
arguing that Hume believed that moral questions can be settled by carefully observing what
things people actually approve of (1976, p.
123). Nonetheless, it is true that Hume often
suggests that common moral opinion is the
authoritative standard for resolving moral and
political disputes: "The general opinion of
mankind has some authority in all cases; but in
this of morals 'tis perfectly infallible" (Treatise,
p. 552; see also Treatise, p. 547n.). Similarly, in
"Of The Original Contract" he says that "in all
questions with regard to morals . . . there is
really no other standard [other than an appeal
to general opinion] by which any controversy
can ever be decided" (Aiken, 1948, p . 371 ). At
the same time, he states with equal clarity,
frequency, and force that the basic standard or
fact in terms of which values may be criticized
is the substantive one of true human interest,
rather than the procedural (and indeterminate)
standard of what most people take that interest
to be: "In all determinations of morality ...
the question cannot, by any means, be decided
with greater certainty than by ascertaining, on
any side, the true interests of mankind" (Morals, pp. 12-13, see also Treatise, p. 562).
As his discussion of courage and glory
suggests, Hume is clearly aware that there may
be disputes between the generality of mankind
on the one hand and persons of sense and cool
reflection on the other concerning which qualities should be called virtuous; and Hume leaves
no doubt as to whose opinion should be
favored in such controversies. His ambivalence
about affirming that there is an objective moral
standard whose existence does not depend
upon consent or convention may well be caused
by the fact that the human interest or the
human good is a sort of final cause, and Hume's
rejection of the intelligibility of teleological
analysis is a central tenet of his empiricist
epistemology (Treatise, p. 171). He sometimes
attempts to resolve possible discrepancies between real human interest and opinions concerning that interest by suggesting that the
moral judgments of societies have progressively
improved from uncultivated times to the present (Morals, p. 79; Forbes, 1975, pp. 87-89),
and even, perhaps, by hinting that there is a
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preestablished harmony between our moral
judgments and their objects similar to that
between our causal judgments and the course of
nature (An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, p. 67; Beck, 1974, p. 225). But
whatever the merit of these sketchy attempts at
reconciling genuine interest and general opinion,15 they should not be allowed to obscure
the fact that, for Hume, a great part of the task
of the social scientist is to criticize ill-founded
moral or political judgments and to suggest
revisions in them wherever possible.1 6

Conclusion
A genuinely Humean social science would
indeed be concerned with the analysis of
certain kinds of facts, and not with exhorting
its audience to be virtuous after one fashion or
another: the social scientist is not a poet or a
painter (Understanding, p. 15). Nor is it his
function to deduce obligatory duties from
supposedly eternal factual verities. But it would
be a one-sided and thus a misleading account of
Hume's social science to say that it simply
treats values as phenomena to be described and
explained by reference to the conditions which
produce them. Rather, the work of the best
social science will be to ascertain as clearly as
possible those fundamental though contingent
facts which define human needs and interests,
and to examine, methodically and reflectively,
the inferences from these facts which are
implicit in judgments of value, and upon which
such judgments are superimposed by our passionate and sympathetic concern with the
interests of mankind. Hume's social science is
thus both factual and critical; its subject matter
is composed of facts and inferences, but its
conclusions are anything but value-neutral.
Thus social science must be objectively critical
in a way that is perfectly consistent with the
is/ought distinction, and, ironically enough,
critical in a way that a rigid and only superficially Humean separation of fact and value
would exclude from the practice of social
science.

1 5They seem to be more aprioristic than the
teleology whose rejection occasions them.
16A brief set of such criticisms and proposals for
revision is presented in Morals, pp. 12-14, where
Hume argues that from the perspective of the true
human interest, alms-giving, tyrannicide, and the
liberality of princes are not virtues, and that luxury is
no vice.
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